

Message Text

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TO WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 122146

TOSEC 17

WHITE HOUSE PLEASE PASS SALZBURG

FOLLOWING REPEAT IAEA VIENNA 4910 ACTION SECSTATE INFO AEC
GERMANTOWN OTTAWA NEW DELHI ISLAMABAD GENEVA USUN TOKYO
BONN 31 MAY

QUOTE

C O N F I D E N T I A L IAEA VIENNA 4910

EO 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, IAEA, US, IN

SUBJ: RECOMMENDED US STATEMENT ON INDIAN NUCLEAR TEST AT
IAEA BOARD JUNE 11-13

REF : (A) STATE 104770; (B) GENEVA 3189 PARA 5; (C) IAEA VIENNA 4657

SUMMARY: CANADA AND PAKISTAN WILL COMMENT ON INDIAN NUCLEAR TEST
AT IAEA BOARD MEETING JUNE 11-13 AND INDIA LIKELY TO REPLY.
MISSION STRONGLY RECOMMENDS US NOT RPT NOT REMAIN SILENT NOR
LIMIT ITSELF TO TWO SENTENCES AUTHORIZED REF A. ACTION
REQUESTED: APPROVAL MISSION'S PROPOSED STATEMENT.

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1. CANADIAN MISSION TELLS US IT WILL MAKE STATEMENT AT

JUNE IAEA BOARD MEETING SIMILAR TO THOSE MADE AT MARCH 1972 MEETING BY US AND IN JUNE 1972 BY UK RE UNDERSTANDINGS INHERENT IN AGREEMENTS FOR COOPERATION IN CIVIL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY AND RELATED SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS (IAEA VIENNA 4670). CANADA EXPECTS MAKE STATEMENT, AS DID US AND UK, UNDER SAFEGUARDS ITEM ON BOARD'S AGENDA. OUR IMPRESSION IS THAT CANADA NOT YET DECIDED WHETHER SPECIFICALLY TIE ITS REMARKS TO INDIAN TEST OR TO CANADA-INDIA AGREEMENTS.

2. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE NO INFORMATION ON PAKISTANI PLANS (THEIR GOVERNOR, AEC CHAIRMAN KHAN, IS NON-RESIDENT), UNIVERSAL ASSUMPTION HERE IN VIEW OF PAKISTANI ACTIVITIES ELSEWHERE IS THAT AT JUNE BOARD KHAN WILL MAKE DIRECT ATTACK ALONG FAMILIAR LINES ON INDIAN TEST, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER CANADA PROVIDES HIM WITH SPRINGBOARD OR NOT. INDIA WILL CERTAINLY REPLY TO EITHER OR BOTH PAKISTANI AND CANADIAN STATEMENTS. OTHER GOVERNORS, E.G., PHILIPPINES, WHO HAS TOLD US HE IS HOPING FOR INSTRUCTIONS TO CONDEMN INDIAN TEST, MAY VERY WELL CHIME IN.

3. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE SERIOUS MISTAKE FOR US TO REMAIN SILENT OR TO LIMIT ITSELF TO TWO SENTENCES AUTHORIZED REF A. TO BE SILENT WOULD CERTAINLY BE MISINTERPRETED AS US BACKTRACKING ON SUPPORT FOR NPT, AND AS EVIDENCE THAT US AND USSR (WHICH WE ASSUME WILL BE SILENT) HAVE SOME SORT OF SUPER-POWER ARRANGEMENT TO KEEP HANDS OFF, DESPITE THE LONG-STANDING OPPOSITION OF BOTH TO PROLIFERATION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS. TO FOLLOW CURRENT GUIDANCE IS PERHAPS APPROPRIATE FOR OTHER ORGANIZATIONS, AS IT WAS FOR DEPARTMENT'S INITIAL PUBLIC REACTION, BUT IT WOULD LAND WITH A THUD IN THE GOVERNING BODY OF THE AGENCY WHOSE PRIMARY STATUTORY PURPOSE IS TO ASSURE APPLICATION OF NUCLEAR ENERGY TO NON-MILITARY USES. THIS PARTICULARLY SO WHEN THREE WEEKS WILL HAVE PASSED SINCE INITIAL US REACTION EXPRESSED. CANADIANS AND OTHERS WILL BE CLOSELY WATCHING WHAT WE SAY, AT SAME TIME AGREEING THAT USG SHOULD NOT USE IAEA FORUM AS SOUNDING BOARD FOR ANTI-INDIA POLEMICS.

4. ANY US STATEMENT HERE SHOULD OF COURSE AVOID TO MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE EXACERBATING US RELATIONS WITH INDIA. OUR
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PURPOSE SHOULD INSTEAD BE TO MAKE CLEAR THAT INDIAN TEST HAS NOT RPT NOT AFFECTED IN ANY WAY FIRMNESS OF OUR COMMITMENT TO NON-PROLIFERATION AND - OF PARTICULAR RELEVANCE IN IAEA CONTEXT - OUR VIEW THAT ANY NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE INESCAPABLY FURTHERS MANUFACTURE OF MILITARY PURPOSES. ANY MISUNDERSTANDING ON THESE POINTS WILL ONLY ENCOURAGE OTHERS TO FOLLOW IN INDIA'S FOOTSTEPS, AND INDEED ENCOURAGE INDIA TO HOLD FURTHER TESTS.

5. WE WANT TO MAKE CLEAR THAT WE DO NOT RPT NOT CONSIDER ANY STATEMENT WE MIGHT MAKE HERE OR ELSEWHERE AS AN ADEQUATE USG RESPNSE TO INDIAN TEST. SERIOUS CONSIDERATION MUST BE GIVEN IN WASHINGTON TO CONCRETE STEPS US CAN TAKE TO ASSURE THAT INDIAN EXPLOSION DOES NOT SUCCEED IN ENHANCING ITS INTERNATIONAL STATUS, TI DISCOURAGE INDIA FROM PURSUING ITS PRESNT COURSE, AND TO PREVENT EMULATION BY OTHERS. WE WILL SUBMIT SEPARATELY SOME SUGGESTIONS CONCERNING LIMITED MEASURES THAT US MIGHT ADOPT IN IAEA. BUT UNAVOIDABLE DEBATE AT JUNE BOARD MAKES IT IMPORTANT FOR US TO KEEP RECORD STRAIGHT IN AMPLIFICATION OF OUR INITIAL PUBLIC STATEMENT, WHILE WE CONTINUE TO REVIEW OUR DISARMAMENT AND OTHER POLICIES IN LIGHT OF NEW DEVELOPMENT.

6. FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT WE RECOMMED AMBASSADOR TAPE MAKE AT APPROPRIATE TIME DURING BOARD MEETING FOLLOWING STATEMENTS BY OTHER GOVERNORS:

"MR. CHAIRMAN, I HAVE NO WISH TO PROLONG THIS DEBATE. BUT

MY GOVERNMENT HAS ASKED ME TO MAKE CLEAR AT THIS MEETING OF THE BOARD THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO CHANGE WHATEVER IN THE LONG-STANDING POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES AGAINST THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES. WE CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY AS ONE OF THE MOST SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE POST-WAR ERA TO DISARMAMENT AND WORLD PEACE. WE THEREFORE CONTINUE TO URGE THOSE STATES WHICH HAVE NOT ADHERED TO THE TREATY TO DO SO.

"I AM ALSO INSTRUCTED TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO CHANGE IN THE VIEW EXPRESSED BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ON MANY OCCASIONS DURING THE NEGOTIATION OF THE NPT AND WHICH IT REITERATED IN ITS FORMAL INSTRUMENT OF RATIFICATION OF ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL II OF THE TREATY OF TLA TELOLCO. "THE
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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS," WE SAID IN THAT DOCUMENT, "THAT THE TECHNOLOGY OF MAKING NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES IS INDISTINGUISHABLE FROM THE TECHNOLOGY OF MAKING NUCLEAR WEAPONS." FOR THAT REASON THE UNITED STATES AT THAT TIME EXPRESSED ITS WILLINGNESS TO COLLABORATE WITH PARTIES TO THAT TREATY, AS IT HAD EARLIER TO PARTIES TO THE NPT, IN CARRYINGOUT EXPLOSIONS OF NUCLEAR DEVICES FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES UNDER APPROPRIATE INTERNATIONAL OBSERVATION AND IN A MANNER CONSISTENT WITH A POLICY OF NOT CONTRIBUTING TO THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPON CAPABILITIES.

"GOVERNORS WILL RECALL THATON MARCH 1, 1972, THE UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE IN THIS BOARD PLACED ON RECORD THE UNDERSTANDING INHERENT IN ALL OF OUR BILATERAL AGREEMENTS FOR COOPERATION THAT THE USE OF ANY MATERIAL OR EQUIPMENT SUPPLIED BY

THE UNITED STATES UNDER SUCH AGREEMENTS FOR ANY NUCLEAR
EXPLOSIVE DEVICE WAS PRECLUDED; AND THE UNDERSTANDING INHERENT
IN THE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS RELATED TO SUCH COOPERATION AGREE-
MENTS, THAT THE AGENCY WOULD VERIFY, INTER ALIA, THAT THE SAFE-
GUARDED MATERIAL WAS NOT USED FOR ANY NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE
DEVICE. THE CONTINUED COOPERATION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH
OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE NUCLEAR FIELD IS DEPENDENT ON THE ASSUR-
ANCE THAT THESE UNDERSTANDINGS HAVE BEEN RESPECTED IN THE
PAST AND THAT THEY WILL CONTINUE TO BE IN THE FUTURE." PORTER
UNQUOTE SISCO

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